Administration of Workmen\u27s Compensation Laws in the Southwest by Kostos, T. Michael
SMU Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 11
1951
Administration of Workmen's Compensation Laws
in the Southwest
T. Michael Kostos
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
T. Michael Kostos, Administration of Workmen's Compensation Laws in the Southwest, 5 Sw L.J. 233 (1951)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol5/iss2/11
NOTES AND COMMENTS
This conclusion was predicated on the assertion that "Congress has
charged the Courts of Appeals and not this Court with the normal
and primary responsibility for granting or denying enforcement
of Labor Board orders."' 7
Raymond L. Britton.
ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS IN THE SOUTHWEST
E ACH of the states in the Union and of the territories of Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone has a workmen's
compensation act of some kind. The purpose of this paper is to
outline and compare the manner in which these acts are admin-
istered in the southwestern states of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas. Claims arising under the compensation statutes of Lou-
isiana and New Mexico are handled directly in the courts and,
therefore, will not be treated herein.
POWERS
Control over workmen's compensation is vested in boards or
commissions, which, ordinarily, are authorized to make rules for
carrying out and enforcing provisions of the compensation act, to
make such orders as meet the ends of justice, to hear and deter-
mine controversies between employer and employee, and to require
injured claimants to submit themselves before them for examina-
tion.
Arkansas. The Arkansas Act is administered by a Board of three
Commissioners, each appointed by the Governor for a term of six
years, at a maximum annual salary of $5,000. One must be a
representative of employers, another of labor and the third, a
practicing attorney, who is automatically the chairman. The Gov-
17 Id. at 502.
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ernor can, at any time, remove any member of the Commission
for inefficiency, neglect of duty or misconduct in office, giving him
notice of the charges and a public hearing thereon. For the pur-
pose of administering the provisions of the Act' the Commission
is authorized (1) to make such rules and regulations as may be
found necessary, (2) to fix compensation of medical and legal
advisers, and (3) to make expenditures for office expense.2 The
Commission can hold hearings at any place within the state.'
The Commission has power to hear and determine all claims
for compensation, to require and order medical services for in-
jured employees and to approve claims for medical services, and
to approve attorneys' fees,' which may not exceed 25 per cent of
the first $1,000 and 10 per cent of all in excess of $1,000. The
Commission has power to excuse failure to give notice of injury,
to approve agreements, to make and modify or rescind awards, to
enter findings of facts and rulings of law, to enter orders in the
appeal of cases, to determine the time for payment of compensa-
tion, to assess penalties, to compute awards, to require and order
physical examinations of injured employees, and to issue sub-
poenas, administer oaths and take testimony by deposition or
otherwise.' The Commission is authorized to appoint referees,
examiners, rate experts, investigators, and medical examiners as
may be required.7
Oklahoma. The State Industrial Commission consists of five
members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent
of the State Senate.8 The term of office is four years. The Gover-
nor can remove any Commissioner for neglect of duty and mis-
conduct in office, giving him notice of the charges and an oppor-
1 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. §§ 81-1301-81-1349.
2 Id. § 81-1342 (f).
8 Id. § 81-1342 (g).




8 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 71.
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tunity for a public hearing before the Governor.9 Wilson Drilling
Co. v. Beyer' declared that the Industrial Commission is a tribunal
of limited jurisdiction, the primary purpose of which is to adjust
settlements between injured employees and their employers in
hazardous employments. Among other things, the Commission
must be in continuous session and open for transaction of busi-
ness during all business hours. The Commission has power to em-
ploy secretaries, inspectors, reporters, statisticians, and clerks.'
Votes must be entered of record, and a report must be made of
each case considered and the award allowed. 2 An order by one
member of the Commission, not approved by a majority of the
members, cannot nullify a valid award. 3 In Continental Oil Co. v.
Hayes 4 the court held that the Industrial Commission is without
power to promulgate a rule which would make mere inaction for
a certain time on an agreed statement of facts equivalent to an
order approving such statement. The approval or disapproval of
an agreed statement of facts by the Industrial Commission con-
templated by Section 26 of the Oklahoma Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is an "official act" of the Commission. The section re-
quires that the affirmative vote of a majority of members acting as
a board and authorized to perform such official act can not be
delegated to or exercised by a clerical employee of the Commis.
sion. 5
Each Commissioner has power to administer oaths, certify to
official acts, take depositions, issue subpoenas, and compel attend-
ance of witnesses and production of books, accounts, papers, rec-
0 Carter v. State, 77 Okla. 31, 186 Pac. 464 (1919) ; see Note, 4 Southwestern L. J.
364, 374 (1950).
10 138. Okla. 248, 280 Pac. 846 (1929).
11 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Pern. Ed.) § 71.
12 Id. § 74. Acts of the Industrial Commission upon matters within its jurisdiction
and required to be recorded can be established only by the record. Nichols v. Farmers
Trading Ass'n, 191 Okla. 24, 126 P. 2d 703 (1942) ; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
Co. v. Ray, 153 Okla. 163, 5 P. 2d 383 (1931).
13 Carl B. King Drilling Co. v. Farley, 155 Okla. 99, 7 P. 2d 862 (1932).
14 157 Okla. 142, 11 P. 2d 470 (1932).
15 Humble Oil Co. & Refining Co. v. Phelps, 166 Okla. 55, 26 P. 2d 207 (1933);
City of Yale v. Jones, 166 Okla. 111, 26 P. 2d 427 (1933).
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ords, documents, and testimony.'6 The Commission may authorize
an inspector to conduct any investigation, inquiry, or hearing, 7
in which case he has the power of a Commissioner." Further, the
Commission can adopt reasonable rules 9 regulating and providing
for the kind and character of notices and the service thereof, na-
ture and extent of the proofs and evidence,2" forms of applica-
tion, 21 methods of making investigations, time within which ad-
judications and awards shall be made,22 and the conduct of hear-
ings, investigations and inquiries.
Texas. The administering authority is the Industrial Accident
Board, consisting of three members appointed for terms of six
years.23 At the time of appointment, members must represent em-
ployers, labor and the public, the latter of whom must be a prac-
ticing attorney, being automatically the chairman and legal ad-
viser of the Board.24 The Board is not a court,2" even though it
16 The Industrial Commission can consider depositions taken before the commis-
sioner of another state, pursuant to notices sent out by the Commission. Standard
Roofing & Material Co. v. Mosley, 176 Okla. 517, 56 P. 2d 847 (1936) ; Ranney Rig
Bldg. Co. v. Givens, 141 Okla. 195, 285 Pac. 23 (1930).
17 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 75.
18 Where the record shows that evidence was taken by an inspector and that he
initialled the order, but the order was made by the Industrial Commission upon a roll
call of the Commission, the presumption is that the record and evidence was before
the Commission and was considered by it. Swift & Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 161 Okla.
132, 17 P. 2d 435 (1932); Brick & Tile Co. v. Huffman, 150 Okla. 9, 300 Pac. 626
(1931).
19 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 77; Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Hornberger,
150 Okla. 257, 1 P. 2d 393 (1931) ; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Cruce, 129 Okla.
60, 263 Pac. 462 (1928).
20 F. W. Merrick, Inc. v. Cross, 144 Okla. 40, 289 Pac. 267 (1930) ; Standard Coal
Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 139 Okla. 269, 281 Pac. 966 (1929).
21 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 134 Okla. 174, 272 Pac. 833 (1928).
22 Where the award of the Industrial Commission is not questioned by application
for rehearing within ten days as provided for by the rules of the Commission, nor
within thirty days by action in the Supreme Court, the award is final and conclusive
upon all questions within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Lubritorium, Inc. v.
Adams, 150 Okla. 254, 1 P. 2d 745 (1931); Liddell v. State Ind. Comm., 126 Okla.
235, 259 Pac. 265 (1927) ; Bedford-Carthage Stone Co. v. Ind. Comm. of Okla., 119
Okla. 231, 249 Pac. 706 (1926).
23 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 1.
24 Id. § 2.
25 Middleton v. T. P. & L. Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556 (1916) ; Vestal v. T. E.
I. A., 285 S. W.1041 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) ; Consolidated Underwriters v. Saxon,
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has quasi-judicial functions,26 but is merely an administrative
agency. However, its decisions are in the nature of judgments and
can not be collaterally attacked.27 The awards of the Board do not
have the "self-executing force" of judgments" and can be given
effect only by suit in the courts." The Board may make all nec-
essary rules, not inconsistent with law, for carrying out and en-
forcing its provisions;" in addition it has powers expressly dele-
gated to it to regulate attorneys' fees, medical, hospital and med-
icine fees and costs, to conduct investigations and hearings, to
make and review and change awards, to force medical examina-
tion, to order operations, to suspend compensation, to approve ad-
justment and settlement of claims for compensation, to inspect
books and records of parties, to punish persons guilty of contempt,
and to bar lawyers guilty of unethical or fraudulent conduct from
appearing before the Board.31 In the exercise of its more purely
administrative functions, the Board must receive and file all re-
ports, notices and papers required by law, the rules of the Board,
notices from employers and insurance carriers of issuance. and
cancellation of policies, reports made by employers of accidents
suffered or injuries sustained by employees, and claims for com-
pensation made by injured workers and dependents of deceased
workers.32 The Board must supervise adjustments of claims vol-
untarily assumed by the insurance carriers."3
265 S. W. 143 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924). The court in Poe v. Continental Oil & Cotton
Co., 231 S. W. 717, 720 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921), declared: "If the Accident Board can
be said to be useful in any respect, it is largely as an administrative board where inter-
ested parties can reach amicable adjustment quickly."
26 T. E. I. A. v. Morgan, 295 S. W. 588 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). Middleton v.
T. P. & L. Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556 (1916), held that the Compensation Act
vests no judicial power in the Board.
27 Security Union Cas. Co. v. Peer Oil Corp., 1 S. W. 2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
28 Ezell v. T. E. I. A., 5 S. W. 2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), rev'd on other points,.
14 S. W. 2d 1018 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
29 Vestal v. T. E. I. A., 285 S. W. 1041 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) ; T. E. I. A. v..
Adcock, 27 S. W. 2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) er. dism'd.
30 TEX. Riv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 4.
31 T. E. I. A. v. Roach, 222 S. W. 159 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
32 TEx. Rix. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 5; Zurich Gen. Acc. Liab. Ins.-
Co. v. Rodgers, 128 Tex. 313, 97 S. W. 2d 674 (1936).
33 Garrett v. U. S. Fidelity & Gty. Co., 77 S. W. 2d 1066 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
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If the insurer fails to comply with the award and fails to ap-
peal, the Board certifies that fact to the Commissioner of Insur-
ance, and such certificate is sufficient cause to justify the Commis-
sioner to revoke or forfeit the license of the insurer to do business
in Texas. 4 Also, the claimant can bring suit on the order, and, if
he secures a judgment, he is entitled to recover the further sum
of 12 per cent of the award as damages together with reasonable
attorney's fees for the prosecution and collection of the suit."5
PROCEDURE
Statutes usually specify the method by which the right of com-
pensation is decided and the amount is determined."6 Such pro-
ceedings are purely statutory, and the procedure pointed out by
the statutes must be followed,37 since the provisions of the act can-
not be waived. In Mingus v. Wadley8 it was declared: "The gen-
eral rule is that where the cause of action and the remedy for its
enforcement are derived, not from the common law, but from
statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and
must be complied with in all respects.. . ." A proceeding in a
compensation case is sui generis, and under most acts it is con-
sidered to be administrative and* not judicial. 9 The action taken
thereunder is usually required to be expeditious to the end that
the purposes of the act are not defeated by delays. This policy was
stated succintly in Ex Parte Central Iron & Coal Co. :
"One of the outstanding purposes of the statute was to facilitate
the settlement of matters of compensation in a simple manner with
34 TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 5a; Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex.
551, 285 S. W. 1084 (1926).
3. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948), art. 8307, § 5; Independence Indemnity Co.
v. White, 27 S. W. 2d 529 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
36 Tex. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 30 S. W. 2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930),
afl'd, 40 S. W. 2d 75 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
'" Indian Territory Illumination Oil Co. v. Ray, 153 Okla. 163, 5 P. 2d 383 (1931).
88 115 Tex. 551, 558, 285 S. W. 1084, 1087 (1926).
39 See cases cited supra note 25.
40 212 Ala. 367, 102 So. 797, 798 (1925).
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least possible expense, and that proceedings to that end be not incum-
bered by technical rules of pleading and procedure."
The courts endeavor to decide questions of practice in favor of
directness and flexibility, and strict rules of practice and pro-
cedure applicable to actions generally are not utilized in proceed-
ings for compensation under the acts.41 Nevertheless, elementary
and fundamental principles of a judicial inquiry are preserved,
and the established rules of procedure in courts of law are con-
sidered so far as applicable." This liberal attitude is not meant
to dispense with mandatory requirements of the act" nor to obviate
the necessity of observing fundamental rules which are essential
to administration of substantial justice between the parties. Thus
it has been said, in Texas Indemnity Co. v. Holloway,"' that pro-
visions of the statute relating to procedure must be strictly or
substantially complied with. However, usually the proceedings
before a board or commission are informal, and the technical
rules of practice and procedure prevailing in the courts are not
applicable."'
The jurisdiction of the board or commission, having once at-
tached, is continuing,46 with the power to make interlocutory find-
ings, orders and awards, even to the extent of modifying awards
made by it, until the cause is legally concluded in accordance with
compensation law.47 Upon full compliance with its award the juris-
diction of the commission is lost, in absence of any provision in
the act continuing it. Having made a final decision, the board can-
41 Vignaul v. Howze, 150 So. 88 (La. App. 1933) ; Clark v. Alexandria Cooperage
& Lumber Co., 157 La. 135, 102 So. 96 (1925).
42.Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Youngblood, 297 S. W. 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
It was held in Smith v. Marine Oil Co., 10 La. App. 674, 121 So. 782 (1929), that
technical objections and defenses not involving matters of substance should be brushed
aside in compensation suits.
43 Fed. Surety Co. v. Jetton, 44 S. W. 2d 923 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
44 30 S. W. 2d 921, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
45 Creek County v. Fobroy, 163 Okla. 276, 21 P. 2d 1060 (1933).
46Wilkerson v. Devonian Oil Co., 114 Okla. 84, 242 Pac. 531 (1926).
"Capitol Iron & Metal Co. v. Rogers, 161 Okla. 137, 17 P. 2d 433 (1932).
1951]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
not, by purporting to retain jurisdiction, deprive the parties of
their right to appeal to the courts from a final ruling.4"
Arkansas. The original hearings for compensation are con-
ducted by referees, who are required to make awards together
with their findings of fact, which are reported to the Commission.
Either party has fourteen days to appeal from the award of a
referee to the entire Commission, where he may have a de novo
hearing. The final award of the Commission is conclusive and
binding on the parties on all findings of facts.
Hearings before the Commission are informal, and the Com-
mission is not bound by technical or statutory rules of evidence
or by technical or formal rules of procedure.49 Declarations of a
deceased employee concerning the injury, in respect of which the
hearing is being had, may be received in evidence, and will, if cor-
roborated by other evidence, be sufficient to establish the injury.5"
Hearsay may be admitted and taken for what it is worth. However,
sufficient evidence must appear in the record to warrant the mak-
ing of an award. Many proceedings for enforcement of a claim
for compensation show that there is a prima facie presumption
that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act, that sufficient
notice thereof was given, and that other elements have been satis-
fied. As a matter of practice, it is probable that the Commission
does not concern itself too greatly with where the burden of proof
lies, so far as claimant is concerned, but looks to the defendant
to allege and prove all matters of defense."
Within ten days after a claim is filed with the Commission, the
Board notifies the employer and any other interested party of the
filing of such claim.52 The Board makes an investigation if it con-
siders it necessary and, upon application of an interested party
or on its own motion, directs that the matter be set down for hear-
48 T. E. I. A. v. Marsden, 57 S. W. 2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
49 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1327(a).
5o Ibid.
51 Kloss v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 207 Ark. 115, 179 S. W. 2d 172 (1944).
52ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1323(b).
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ing before a referee. Ten days' notice of hearing must be given
the parties.5" The award of the referee, together with findings, must
be given the parties, along with a copy of the proceedings, as soon
as possible.54 If an application for review is filed in the office of
the Commission within thirty days from the date of receipt of the
award, the full Commission has to review the award or, if deemed
advisable, hear the parties, their representatives and witnesses, and
make and file awards and rulings of law as in an original hear-ing. 55
Oklahoma. Notice of injury must be given to the Commission
and to the employer within thirty days after the injury.56 Such
notice may be given by any person claiming to be entitled to com-
pensation or by someone in his behalf.57 Failure to give such notice,
unless excused by the Commission either on the ground that notice,
for some sufficient reason, could not have been given58 or on the
ground that the insurance carrier or employer has not been preju-
diced thereby, 59 is a bar to any claim.6" The Industrial Commis-
sion, before excusing the claimant's failure to give written notice
of injury, is without jurisdiction to award compensation. 3 In For-
rest Oil Corp. v. Breshears62 it was held that where an employer
brought a proceeding to review an award for permanent partial
disability, it was not necessary for the employee to file a new
53 Id. § 81-1323 (c) .
54 Long-Bell Lbr. Co. v. Mitchell, 206 Ark. 854, 177 S. W. 2d 920 (1944).
55 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1327(a) ; Fordyce Lbr. Co. v. Shelton, 206 Ark. 1134,
179 S. W. 2d 464 (1944).
56 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 24; Trigg Drilling Co. v. Thomas, 160 Okla.
85, 15 P. 2d 985 (1932).
57 If there is competent evidence to sustain a finding of the State Industrial Com-
mission that neither the employer nor insurance carrier was prejudiced by failure to
give written notice, the award will not be vacated for failure to give such notice.
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Snider, 196 Okla. 433, 165 P. 2d 634 (1945).
58 The purpose is to afford an opportunity to the employer to investigate to deter-
mine whether there is an accidental injury within the terms of the Act. Amerada Petro-
leum Corp. v. Lovelace, 184 Okla. 140, 85 P. 2d 407 (1938).
9 Wirt Franklin Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, 164 Okla. 129, 23 P. 2d 644 (1933).
60 Dover Oil Co. v. Bellmyer, 163 Okla. 51, 20 P. 2d 556 (1933).
61 Pioneer Gas Utilities Co. v. Howard, 154 Okla. 239, 7 P. 2d 435 (1932).
62201 Okla. 116, 202 P. 2d 706 (1949).
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claim in order to introduce evidence of disability based on injuries
not included in his initial claim for compensation.
Any time after the expiration of the first five days of disability
on the part of an injured employee, a claim for compensation may
be presented to the Commission." Upon application, the Commis-
sion may set down the claim for hearing and, after notice to the
adverse party, proceed to hear and determine liability." Hearings
can be held before any member of the Commission. 5 When a
cause is properly before the Commission, the entire range of dis-
ability may be inquired into and an award made in accordance
with the facts.6 Where the claimant's disability is of such char-
acter as to require skilled and professional men to determine the
cause and extent thereof, the question is one of science and must
be proved by expert testimony. 7 If the Commission denies the
award for failure to give notice of injury and there is any evi-
dence reasonably tending to support the order denying the award,
the decision of the Commission cannot be disturbed on review."6
The Commission is at liberty to refuse to give effect to any portion
of the evidence which in its opinion is not entitled to belief and is
not required to give credence to the greater amount of evidence
as against the lesser.6 9
Texas. The Industrial Accident Board is not governed by rules
of pleading and evidence that prevail in the courts, but is free to
act in its own way and to adopt such speedy and informal proced-
ures as it may deem fit.70 There is no jury provided for, and, since
review by courts is through a trial de novo, no record is preserved
for appellate purposes.7 No terms or sessions of the Board are
63 85 OKLA. STAT. ANr. (Perm. Ed.) § 26.
64 Id. § 41.
65 U. S. Fidelity & Gty. Co. v. Cruce, 129 Okla. 60, 263 Pac. 462 (1928).
66 Sparkman v. Cosden Pipe Line Co., 182 Okla. 184, 77 P. 2d 21 (1938).
67 Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., v. Holbrook, 215 P. 2d 836 (Okla. 1948);
Gentry v. State Ind. Comm., 210 P. 2d 160 (Okla. 1948).
68 Johnson v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 201 Okla. 206, 203 P. 2d 717 (1949).
69 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., v. Spencer, 195 Okla. 300, 157 P. 2d 186 (1945).
70 Miller v. T. E. I. A., 63 S. W. 2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
71 Southern Cas. Co. v. Fulkerson, 30 S. W. 2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on
other points, 45 S. W. 2d 152 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
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provided by law, and the Board is always open to receive, hear
and determine complaints.72 The Act does not require that all
claimants involved in a particular case enter a personal appear-
ance. Thus, where a number of persons claim to be beneficiaries
of a deceased employee, any one of them may file a claim in behalf
of all,7" and the Board will determine their respective rights and
apportion the award among them.".
The insurer is a necessary party to the proceeding before the
Board. If the insurer is not joined, the Board is without jurisdic-
tion to make any award that affects any interest of the insurer,
unless, of course, the insurer voluntarily intervenes.75 The claim-
ant must give notice of his injury to his employer within 30 days
after the accident.76 This provision is mandatory, and observance
of it is essential to jurisdiction of the Board.77 The claimant next
files with the Board a proper statement of his claim.7" Although the
claim is in the nature of a pleading, it is much less formal than
the ordinary pleading and need not be alleged with the same par-
ticularity as would be required in court.79 All that is required is
an intelligible statement of the matters in controversy, describing
the injury in a general way, identifying the interested parties, and
narrating the manner in which it occurred."
The claim having been duly filed, the Board must hold a hear-
ing within a reasonable time, unless the claimant is being paid
compensation and furnished hospitalization or medical treatment,
72 T. E. I. A. v. Williams, 57 S. W. 2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
73 Security Union Ins. Co. v. Reed, 42 S. W. 2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
74 T. E. I. A. v. Knouff, 271 S. W. 633 (Ter. Civ. App. 1925) er. ref.
75 Case cited supra note 73.
76 TE.x. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 4a; Williamson v. Tex. Ind.
Ins. Co., 90 S. W. 2d 1088 (1936).
77 Morgan v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 40 S. W. 2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) er. ref.
78 Merritt v. Amer. Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 67 F. 2d 777 (5th Cir. 1933).
79 Great American Indemnity Co. v. McElyea, 57 S. W. 2d 966 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) er. ref.
80 When the claimant asks for compensation only in respect of a specific injury,
the Board may not consider any other or a general injury. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v.
Choate, 126 Tex. 368, 89 S. W. 2d 205 (1936).
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in which case the Board may, "within its discretion, delay or post-
pone the hearing.""1 The Board may hold hearings or take testi-
mony "at any point within this State,"" provided due notice there-
of is given to all the parties in interest.83 While the burden rests
upon the claimant, 4 he is not required to put in all his evidence
nor need he prove his case by witnesses personally present at the
hearing; the Board is authorized to receive ex parte statements
under oath as well as other evidence not usually received in courts
of law. 5 Inasmuch as the proceedings are informal, the Board is
bound by no specific procedural requirements. The province of
the Board is to determine the facts of the controversy, and so long
as its rulings and decisions are based upon the facts presented,
the Board performs its duty. 6
While an award of compensation or an order denying it is
regarded as a final order, 7 not all orders of the Board are of this
kind. An order directing a claimant to undergo a hernia opera-
tion, for example, is purely interlocutory. 8 An award or order is
in the nature of a judgment, and, unless and until it is set aside
by the taking of an appeal, it is binding and conclusive upon the
parties.8 9 An award is not subject to collateral attack, and, in re-
spect of jurisdictional matters, it is said that the recitals therein
import absolute verity."
The Board may, either upon its own motion or upon the appli-
cation of any person interested showing a change of condition,
s81 But the Board has no authority to postpone the bearing upon any claim properly
before it. Todd v. So. Cas. Co., 18 S. W. 2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
82 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 10.
83 Associated Ind. Corp. v. Baker, 76 S. W. 2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism'd.
84 Barta v. Tex. Reciprocal Ins. Ass'n, 67 S. W. 2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. ref.
85 T. E. I. A. v. Jimenez, 267 S. W. 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) er. dism'd w. o. j.
86 "All rulings and decisions of the board relating to disputed claims shall be upon
questions of fact and in accord with the provisions of this law." TEx. REv. CMy. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 4.
87 Welch v. U. S. Fidelity & Gty. Co., 54 S. W. 2d 1041 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) er.
dism'd.
8 T. E. I. A. v. Marsden, 127 Tex. 84, 92 S. W. 2d 237 (1936).
89 T. E. I. A. v. Morgan, 295 S. W. 588 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
90T. E. 1. A. v. Adcock, 27 S. W. 2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) er. dism'd.
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mistake or fraud, "review any award or order, ending, diminish-
ing, or increasing compensation previously awarded, within the
maximum and minimum provided in this Law, or change or revoke
its previous order denying compensation. -." While it appears
to be settled that this provision was not intended to authorize the
Board to furnish a second trial on the same issues or to enable it
to correct errors of law occurring in the original proceeding,"
there are definite suggestions in the decisions that the Board has
inherent power to correct clerical errors, inadvertencies and mis-
takes manifest upon the record, in the same manner that courts
correct judgments by nunc pro tunc orders,9" and to revise orders
upon a showing of change of conditions. This was clearly shown
in Hoyle v. Federal Lloyds of America,"' wherein it was stated:
"It seems to be equally well settled that until some party at interest
has perfected an appeal, the Industrial Accident Board retains juris-
diction of the parties and the subject-matter, and can make any orders
with reference thereto it thinks proper."
It has also been held that the Board may set aside an award on a
showing that an interested party had no notice of the hearing.95
The Board's power to revise its own awards and orders is lim-
ited and may only revise orders denying compensation; it may not
revise orders approving compromise settlements and the like.9"
And, of course, the power may be exercised only while the Board
has jurisdiction of the cause.97 When an appeal is taken or a suit
is brought to enforce the award, the Board loses jurisdiction, and
its revisory power is at an end.9" And the same situation arises at
91 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8306, § 12d.
92 Jones v. Cas. Reciprocal Exchange, 275 S. W. 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) er. ref.
aa Blair v. Millers' Indemnity Underwriters, 220 S. W. 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
9 295 S. W. 202, 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) er. ref.
95 Associate Ind. Corp. v. Baker, 76 S. W. 2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism'd.
96 Commercial Cas. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S. W. 2d 1081 (1935).
'T Daniels v. Southern Surety Co., 40 S. W. 2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) er. ref.
Us Vestal v. T. E. I. A., 285 S. W. 1041 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
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the expiration of the compensation period. Once the insurer has
paid the compensation ordered, the Board is powerless to impose
a new liability upon it.99 The Board's power to review awards and
orders may be exercised only upon a showing of definite fraud,
mistakes of a factual character, or a change in the claimant's
physical condition.'"0
An application for review of an award may be made at any
time prior to the end of the compensation period. But where it is
sought to review an order denying compensation, the rule is dif-
ferent; in such cases, the act provides that the application must
be made within 12 months after entry of the order, "and not after-
ward," and "shall be only upon notice to the parties interested."'01
When the Board alters or revokes a previous order, it must imme-
diately send to the parties a copy of its subsequent order.' 2
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Limitations on the right or extent of appeal to the courts from
awards by boards and commissions have been generally sus-
tained.'0 3 Under a constitutional authority to provide for settle-
ment of compensation disputes, the legislature has authority to
limit review of compensation awards to the manner specified and
to make them otherwise presumptively valid. In Obrecht-Lynch
Corp. v. Clark1' it was said:
"... [I]t is well settled that compensation laws of this general char-
acter, which establish administrative machinery for applying statutory
measures to the facts of each particular case, and which provide for a
hearing before an administrative tribunal, may limit the judicial review
to fundamental and jurisdictional questions."
99 Southern Cas. Co. v. Boykin, 298 S. W. 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
100 The Board may not set its award aside for a mere mistake of law. Cone v. T. E.
I. A., 251 S. W. 262(Tex.Civ. App. 1923).
103 Tex. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8306, § 12d.
102 Ibid; Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S. W. 2d 1081 (1935).
103 Obrecht-Lynch Corp. v. Clark, 30 F. 2d 144 (D. Md. 1929).
104 Id. at 146.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Provisions making the award or findings of the board or com-
mission conclusive on appeal as to questions of fact have been
sustained as not invalidly delegating judicial powers," 5 and as
not denying due process of law; likewise a limitation of judicial
review to cases in which "the findings of fact of the commission
do not support the order or award" is not a denial of due process
of law.0 6 However, the parties cannot be deprived of the right to
have court review of action of the board to the extent of deter-
mining whether it has acted illegally or without jurisdiction.0 7
Arkansas. Upon appeal from an award of the Arkansas Work-
men's Compensation Commission, the court can review only ques-
tions of law, with power to modify, reverse, remand for rehearing,
or set aside only on the following grounds: that the Commission
acted without or in excess of its powers; that the facts found by
the Commission do not support the award; that there was not suf-
ficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of
the award; or that the award was procured by fraud.' 8 Un-
der this statutory provision awards of the Commission have re-
ceived friendly consideration from the Arkansas Supreme Court.
In almost every case that court has reiterated that findings of fact
by the Commission are final if supported by substantial evi-
dence.0 9 Appeal is a matter of right and may be had by either
party when the statutory requirements are followed. Appellant
must file notice with the Commission within thirty days from the
date of the final award," 0 whereupon the Commission must trans-
fer the transcript, findings, award, documents on file, reports and
any other matters on file relative to the proceedings to the circuit
court of the county in which the injury occurred."'
lo5 Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41 F. 2d 593 (4th Cir. 1930).
1 06 Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Wisc., 271 U. S. 208 (1925).
107 Courter v. Simpson Constr. Co., 264 Ill. 488, 106 N. E. 350 (1914).
10s ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1325.
109 Ibid.
11o Ibid.
111 J. L. Williams & Sons v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S. W. 2d 82 (1943).
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In Garrison Furniture Co. v. Butler"2 the Supreme Court of
Arkansas dealt with an award in which one issue was based almost
entirely on hearsay. The only evidence that the deceased had suf-
fered an injury while at work consisted of the employee's own
statements made to members of his family and to other employees
prior to his death. Hearsay, of course, is admissible before the
Commission."' But some courts have held that an award may not
be maintained when the only evidence supporting it is hearsay."'
Other courts have held that hearsay should be given probative
value and should be deemed sufficient to support a finding when
of a character relied upon by reasonable persons in their important
daily affairs, particularly where better evidence is not available.
In the Butler case the court aligned Arkansas with states support-
ing the latter view.
Oklahoma. The award or decision of the Commission is final
and conclusive upon all questions within its jurisdiction between
the parties, unless, within 20 days after a copy of the award or
decision is sent the parties, an action is filed to review such award
or decision." 5 A peculiarity of the Oklahoma system is that actions
for review are filed directly in the highest court of the state-the
Supreme Court. The proceeding is heard in a summary manner
and has precedence over most other civil cases in that court. The
Commission is deemed a party to such proceeding, and the Attorney
General represents it therein. Such action is subject to the law and
practice applicable to other civil actions cognizable in said court."'
Upon final determination of the action in which the award or de-
cision of the Commission is sought to be reviewed, the Commission
makes an order or decision in accordance with the judgment or
decision of the court." 7 A "party interested" having right to bring
112206 Ark. 702, 177 S. W. 2d 738 (1946).
113 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1327(a) provides that declarations of a deceased
employee concerning his injury are admissible.
114 Carrol v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
11' 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 29.
116 Ibid.
117 Taylor v. Langley, 188 Okla. 646, 112 P. 2d 411 (1941).
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suit to review an award of the Commission must have a present,
direct, pecuniary interest in the subject matter and have suffered
a real wrong in the particular case."'
One who has presented his case or defense before the Commis-
sion upon a certain theory will not ordinarily be permitted to pre-
vail upon another theory in the Supreme Court or to raise an issue
which has not been previously passed on by the Commission." 9
In Sparkman v. Cosden Pipe Line Co. 120 the court held that in the
absence of any evidence in the record to the contrary, it must be
presumed that a finding of the Commission was justified by com-
petent evidence adduced before the Commission.' The Commis-
sion's fact findings on issues relating to its jurisdiction are not
binding upon review, but the Supreme Court must weigh the evi-
dence and arrive at its own view of the effect thereof to afford
judicial process to the complaining party.'22 And it will not accept
as conclusive a finding of the Commission on jurisdictional ques-
tions, but will make its own independent finding with respect
thereto. 2 However, where there is evidence to support the find-
ing of the Commission that an accidental injury was sustained,
such finding will not be disturbed on appeal' 24 An award of the
Commission based on a material finding of fact which is unsup-
ported by any competent evidence will be vacated by the Supreme
Court in review as a matter of law.' Of course, where the findings
of fact and conclusions of law of the Commission are too indefinite
for judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court, on appeal, will
vacate the order and remand the case for further proceedings.'26
118 Cameron & Henderson, Inc. v. Franks, 199 Okla. 143, 184 P. 2d 965 (1947).
119 Board of County Commissioners of Payne County v. Hayter, 192 Okla. 262, 135
P. 2d 975 (1943). -
120 182 Okla. 184, 77 P. 2d 21 (1938).
121 Double-Cola Bottling Co. v. Singletary, 185 Okla. 242, 91 P. 2d 77 (1939).
122 Hurley v. O'Brien, 192 Okla, 137 P. 2d 592 (1943).
123 Briscoe Contr. Co. v. Miller, 184 Okla. 136, 85 P. 2d 420 (1938).
124 Clarksburg Paper Co. v. Roper, 196 Okla. 504, 166 P. 2d 425 (1946).
125 Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. Davison, 192 Okla. 13, 132 P. 2d 937
(1942).
126 Special Indemnity Fund of Okla. v. Hewes, 214 P. 2d 240 (Okla. 1950).
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An award having been sustained by the Supreme Court, the mat-
ters decided become res judicata as to the parties. 7 and are not
challengeable in a collateral action for alleged error therein.' 8
Texas. Any interested party who desires judicial review of an
award of the Industrial Accident Board must, within 20 days after
rendition of the award, file with it notice that he will not abide by
the award and then, within 20 days after giving such notice, must
bring suit in the county in which the injury occurred, to set aside
the award of the Board. Compliance with these provisions is man-
datory and jurisdictional. 2 ' Unless the notice called for is timely
given and suit thereafter is timely brought, the court has no juris-
diction to review the case. 8 ' A suit to set aside an award for an
injury suffered outside the limits of the state must be brought
either (a) in the county where the contract of hiring was made or
(b) in the county where the employee or his beneficiaries reside
at the time of filing suit or (c) in the county where the employee
or employer resided when the contract of hiring was entered into,
as the one filing the suit may elect.'8 '
The legal effect of bringing a suit to set aside an award or order
is to divest the Board of all jurisdiction in respect of the claim and
to invest the court with jurisdiction over all parties and issues
concerned, 32 "subject only to the qualification that rights and
liability of the parties shall still be determined by provisions of
the act.""' Once suit is duly and properly filed, the Board loses
all control over the proceeding and can take no further step toward
127 0. C. Whitaker, Inc. v. Dillingham, 194 Okla. 421, 152 P. 2d 371 (1944).
128 White v. Shell Oil Co., 193 Okla., 374, 143 P. 2d 825 (1943); Southwestern
Brewing Corp. v. Cothrum, 184 Okla. 63, 84 P. 2d 609 (1938).
129 It is clear that the court does not acquire jurisdiction of the cause until the
appeal from the award has been actually perfected. Millers' Indemnity Underwriters
v. Hayes, 240 S. W. 904 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
130 Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S. W. 1084 (1926).
131 TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8306, § 19.
132 Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Choate, 126 Tex. 368, 89 S. W. 2d 205 (1936).




adjustment of the controversy." 4 While there are decisions to the
effect that filing of suit merely suspends the award and that it is
restored to effectiveness upon abandonment or dismissal of the
action,18 it now seems to be definitely settled that the award is
abrogated and vacated in toto when the suit to set aside is filed and
that a claimant is "out of court without an award or judgment in
his favor."'""
Since the court's power to act in a compensation case is depend-
ent upon prior authorized action of the Board, it is clear that unless
the Board had jurisdiction, the court itself can have none.'87 And
this means, of course, that there must either be pleading and proof,
or an agreement of the parties, that a claim for compensation was
filed within the time allowed by law,' or that there was good
cause for any delay that may have occurred.'89 The cause of action
alleged in court must conform to that pressed before the Board,
and if it differs therefrom in a material particular, the court has
no alternative but to dismiss the proceeding."'
Once a suit to set aside an award has been duly instituted in the
proper court, it is conducted in the same general manner as all
other actions filed therein. It is a trial de novo."' Citation is issued
and served, parties are joined, and pleadings filed, as in any other
suit.1 2 Since the verdict might be influenced if jurors were allowed
to know the tenor of the Board's decision, it is a settled rule that
they should not be informed thereof either "by the introduction of
evidence, pleading, or remark of counsel.""' 8 The statute provides
154 T. E. I. A. v. Boudreaux, 213 S. W. 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), rev'd on other
points, 231 S. W. 756 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
135 Wilson v. Associated Ind. Corp., 74 F. 2d 896 (5th Cir. 1935).
136 Tex. Rec. Ins. Ass'n v. Leger, 128 Tex. 319, 97 S. W. 2d 677 (1936).
137 Cooper v. U. S. Fidelity & Gty. Co., 29 S. W. 2d 971 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
138 Durham v. Tex. Ind. Ins. Co., 60 S. W. 2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. dism'd.
139 Fox v. T. E. I. A., 94 S. W. 2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
140 Stratton v. Gulf Cas. Co., 53 S. W. 2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
141 New York Ind. Co. v. Rasmusson, 1 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. Tex. 1932).
142 Jago v. Ind. Ins. of North America, 120 Tex. 204, 36 S. W. 2d 980 (1931).
143 Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Klatt, 47 S. W. 2d 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)
er. dism'd.
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that in all suits "the burden of proof shall be upon the party claim-
ing compensation." '144 This means that even though the suit is
brought by the insurer, the claimant must prove by a preponder-
ance of evidence every fact not admitted or agreed to by his oppo-
nent, and failing therein, the claimant cannot hope to prevail.145
The court decides the case upon the preponderance of evidence,
and exclusionary rules apply as in other court proceeedings.
T. Michael Kostos.
144 Ti~x. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 5.
145 But when the employee has proved his case according to the statute, "then the
burden shifts to the insurer to defeat that claim if he can." Southern Surety Co. v.
Scheel, 49 S. W. 2d 937, 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), rev'd on other points, 125 Tex. 1,
78 S. W. 2d 173 (1935).
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